It has been written by people with far more knowledge of the situation than I who also have far more experience in understanding, analyzing and projecting intelligence data. It seems consistent with what I have been reading, and is obviously very carefully written and edited. It presents a bleak picture.
I recommend it in the context of this blog about Knowledge for Development for its discussion of how National Intelligence Estimates are created in the United States in general, and how this one was created specifically. The process is impressive.
The nine page report also devotes almost a page to explaining the various shadings of likelihood that are used, distinguishing them from the confidence the authors have in the likelihood estimates. This could serve as a model for any group seeking to present situation estimates or future scenarios.
Check out:
* "Iraq, and Analysis, Revisited: Intelligence Community Took New Approach After 2002 Errors" by Dafna Linzer in The Washington Post, February 3, 2007
* "CIA Whites Out Controversial Estimate on Iraq Weapons" National Intelligence Archives, 9 July 2004
No comments:
Post a Comment