We now know that the Bush administration was wrong on two key issues about the situation on the ground when it started the war in Iraq: there were no weapons of mass destruction as the administration had believed and there was no likelihood that the Saddam Husein government would support Al Qaeda. While the administration was correct in its belief that the forces it deployed could quickly defeat the Iraqi military and overthrow the Iraqi government, it was quite wrong in its belief as to what policies and programs would rebuild Iraq, how long that process would take, the likelihood of an insurgency, and the cost of occupation. Apparently the problem was not that there did not exist in the United States people with the knowledge and experience to make better judgments, but that the Bush administration did not draw upon and utilize the knowledge and understanding of those people adequately.
The situation in the region has apparently evolved in ways that the Bush administration did not foresee or understand. Iran, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Israel and Kurdish-Turkish relations all seem to be danger points in ways that had not been properly anticipated by the Bush administration. The evolution of these danger points seems to be very difficult to predict, as is the future of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states. Yet U.S. policy in the region should clearly be made based on a realistic understanding of current situations and accurate predictions of the consequences that would result from alternative strategies.
Is there any reason to believe that as it has gotten older, the Bush administration has gotten wiser? Is the administration any better able to identify those with true expertise in the region, to draw upon that expertise, and to make better decisions than it did five and six years ago?
Sunday, June 17, 2007
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