Unclassified Executive Summary: "Review of Pre-Iraqi War Activities by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy."

The testimony of the Department of Defense Acting Inspector General on Feith's Office's intelligence activities in the buildup to the Iraq war has been all over the news. Here is the brief, not very informative unclassified Executive Summary of the IG report, for those interested.

Perhaps more interesting, from the IG's website, is the overview of the briefing. It lays out in clear language:

* The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy [OUSD(P)] developed, produced, and then disseminated alternative intelligence assessments on the Iraq and al-Qaida relationship, which included some conclusions that were inconsistent with the consensus of the Intelligence Community, to senior decision makers.

* While such actions were not illegal or unauthorized, the actions were, in our opinion, inappropriate given that the products did not clearly show the variance with the consensus of the Intelligence Community and were, in some cases, shown as intelligence products.

* This condition occurred because the OUSD(P) expanded its role and mission from formulating Defense Policy to analyzing and disseminating alternative intelligence. As a result, the OUSD(P) did not provide "the most accurate analysis of intelligence" to senior decision makers.

I quote from Senator Carl Levin's Questions and the Acting IG's responses:

1. Did the Office of Under Secretary Feith produce its own intelligence analysis of the relationship between lraq and a1 Qaeda and present its analysis to other offices in the Executive branch (including the Secretary of Defense and the staffs of the National Security Council and the Office of the Vice President)?

Yes. In our report we discuss that members of the OUSD(P) produced a briefing on terrorism based on intelligence reports and provided to the Executive Branch.

2. Did the intelligence analysis produced by Under Secretary Feith's office differ from the lntelligence Community analysis on the relationship between lraq and a1 Qaeda?

Yes. The OUSD(P) analysis included some conclusions that differed from that of the Intelligence Community.

3. Was the alternative OSD Policy intelligence analysis supported by the underlying intelligence?

Partially. The alternative intelligence analysis that OUSD(P) produced was not fully supported by underlying intelligence.

6. Did the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy prepare and present
briefing charts concerning the relationship between lraq and a1 Qaeda that went beyond available intelligence by asserting that an alleged meeting between lead 9/77 hijacker Mohammed Atta and lraqi intelligence officer al-Ani in Prague in April 2001 was a 'known' contact?'

Yes. The OUSD(P) produced a briefing, "Assessing the Relationship between lraq and al-Qaida," in which one slide discussed the alleged meeting in Prague between Mohammed Atta and lraqi Intelligence officer al-Ani as a "known contact."

7. Did the staff of the OUSDP present a briefing on the Iraq-a1 Qaeda relationship to the White House in September 2002 unbeknownst to the Director of Central Intelligence, containing information that was different from the briefing presented to the DCI, not vetted by the lntelligence Community, and that was not supported by the available intelligence (for example, concerning the alleged Atta meeting), without providing the IC notice of the briefing or an opportunity to comment?

Yes. The OUSD(P) presented three different versions of the same briefing, of which some of the information was supported by available intelligence, to the Secretary of Defense, the DCI, the Deputy National Security Advisor and the Chief of Staff, OVP.

8. Did the staff of the OUSDP undercut the lntelligence Community (IC) in its briefing to the White House staff with a slide that said there were 'fundamental problems' with the way the IC was assessing information concerning the relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda, and inaccurately suggesting that the IC was requiring 'juridical evidence to support a finding,' while not providing the IC notice of the briefing or an opportunity to comment.

Yes. We believe that the slide undercuts the Intelligence Community by indicating to the recipient of the briefing that there are "fundamental problems" with the way that the Intelligence Community was assessing information.

9. Did the OSD Policy briefing to the White House draw conclusions (or 'findings') that were not supported by the available intelligence, such as the 'intelligence indicates cooperation in all categories; mature, symbiotic relationship', or that there were 'multiple areas of cooperation,' and shared interest and pursuit of WMD, ' and 'some indications of possible Iraqi coordination with al Qaida specifically related to 9/11 '

Yes. The briefing did draw conclusions that were not fully supported by the available intelligence.

Comment: There are a lot of people who will comment more knowledgeably about this than I ever could. I will note however, that there seems to be a generalizable lesson in this. We know that there is mission creep in organizations, as some units seek to take over responsibilities of others. Decision makers would seem well advised to be sure that when that happens, and they get information from subordinates out of the normal organizational flow, they compare carefully that from the authorized sources and the new sources. It is probably desirable to get each to comment on the other's submission for an important decision. JAD