Thinking about Iraq

How should the government think about Iraq? Perhaps it would be helpful to address the question of the process of thinking about Iraq.

Framing the question

• Is the issue how to bring stability to Iraq? Or is it to bring stability with a reasonably pro-U.S. government?
• Is the issue one of stabilization of the region involving Iraq, its immediate neighbors, and the trans-Gulf states?
• Is the concern broader, taking in an area from Israel and Palestine to Pakistan and India?
• Is the issue the overall relations of the United States with other nations, including the NATO states, Russia, China, etc.
• Is the issue security of the United States against terrorism, or does it include broader security issues, or does it include economic and other foreign policy issues as well?
• How does domestic policy and domestic politics enter into the calculations?

I suggest that all of these issues should be taken into account. Different players in the government should be focusing on different levels of these issues. Those in Iraq will of course be focusing on Iraq itself. The U.S. and the U.S. government are big, and have the resources to do many things at once. The issue is to coordinate among the policy analysts, assuring for example that those who are planning specifically about Iraq are doing so in ways that are consistent with larger foreign policy interests and domestic policy and political realities.

Understanding the situation

Decisions depend on the understanding of the situation to which the decision is a response. It seems clear that the Bush administration very badly misunderstood the situation in Iraq before the invasion. I don't know that there is adequate reason to believe that the understanding of the situation is sufficiently improved to make good decisions now. As this blog has pointed out in the past, the issue is now whether a good understanding exists in the United States or in the government, which seems likely, but whether our best or even an adequate understanding can be brought to bear on the decision; will bad understanding drive out the good in the decision process that is used?

If the understanding of the military situation and the links between government and terrorists in Iraq that was brought to bear on the invasion decision, and of the culture of Iraqi's that was brought to bear on the expectations for the post invasion period were so inadequate, what hope is there that the understanding of the situation in the ever broader policy arenas described above will be acceptably accurate?

Contingency planning

How should the military organize the withdrawal from Iraq if ordered to withdraw? How should it increase troop strength if ordered to do so? How should it redeploy troops to change tactics from urban pacification to limiting foreign incursions if so ordered? How should the military redeploy if ordered to support Turkey in pacification of Kurdish anti-Turkish forces in the North. In these examples, the creation of a plan is relatively uncomplicated by the outside situation. Thus the military can plan for a change in troop strength in terms of the logistics of recruitment, movement and logistics of supply without too much concern for the political, economic, and cultural conditions in the wider region, leaving those larger issues to the diplomats and statesmen.

There seems to be a tendency in the media to publicize each discovered contingency plan made with respect to Iraq as if it is the one and only plan. I hope that all those people in the Pentagon are making many contingency plans. We should be able to move quickly to increase or to decrease troop levels, to withdraw or to move troops, or to do whatever the civilian authorities decide is to be done. Thus I would hope that there are a broad range of contingency plans that are continuously updated.

The broader issues of foreign policy and the involvement of a broad range of military, political, economic and cultural instruments brings even logistical contingency planning to a level of challenging complexity.

Projection of impacts

In foreign policy decision making, the most difficult aspect seems to me to be the projection of what will happen in response to the alternative actions under consideration. Again, the experience in Iraq, Israel, Pakistan, North Korea and other locations suggests that the Bush administration has not been very good at such projections. The President now is projecting generally that the results of withdrawal of troops from Iraq will be very bad. He does not say exactly how they will be bad, nor the probabilities assigned to each possible outcome, nor the evidence on which those fears are based. Do we believe his projections now?

Implications

The complexity of U.S. foreign policy concerns at this time seems to make it very difficult to define tactics with a high probability of solving problems such as stabilization of Iraq, stabilization of the Gulf region, resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian issues, reducing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, eliminating the threats of terrorism, and on and on. What then are we to do?

One suggestion is that we concentrate on building strong strategic positions which will allow us to respond to unforeseen difficulties and events that are sure to come in the future. Thus we should seek to assure the economy is strong, and that our military is not too stretched by current assignments to respond to new challenges should they arise. We should keep our alliances strong. We should observe neutrals and enemies closely.

Similarly, we should not make tactical decisions that assume that those who oppose us are naive or foolish, especially when those tactical decisions would be likely to result in a weakening of our strategic position were they to fail to achieve their purposes. If we act under conditions of uncertainty, the likelihood of adverse outcomes of precipitous actions must be considered to be high. I would put the decision to divert troops from dealing with the terrorist leaders in Afghanistan before they were eliminated in the category of such a bad tactical decision.

I suggest also that we adopt a long time frame for our thinking. These problems are not going to be solved in the year and a half remaining of the Bush administration, nor in the following eight years. We should therefore think of long term solutions to encourage changes of public opinion favorable to the United States, and changes in political and economic realities in other nations that will relieve strains that make them likely to act badly on the international stage.

I also suggest that we assume a more mature approach to international affairs. It seems to me that we should be willing to forgo some short term economic advantages in order to assure that environmental conditions do not deteriorate too much in the long term. We should negotiate in the understanding that other nations have legitimate aspirations and that compromise is not only fair but it is also in the long run the more effective way of dealing with conflicting aspirations. (These are things we should have learned to apply in personal dealings in kindergarten.)

I suggest that we also emphasize morality in decision making on foreign affairs. It is the right thing to do, and it is in the long run the most effective way to run our foreign policy. Responses to threats and attacks should be proportional to their magnitude. If the United States is seen as promoting the welfare of people all over the world, of fighting against oppression and for freedom, of being a solid and useful member of the community of nations, then all our international conflicts become easier to solve.

As we seek to replace the Bush administration in the next election, lets think about which party and which leadership is most likely to deliver a better decision process for international affairs. This is not just a question of which candidate is smarter or more ethical, but which is likely to create an administration that brings knowledge, wisdom and ethics most effectively to the process of foreign policy decision making.