Iraq exemplifies a key element of decision making

The initial decision to invade Iraq was followed by a series of decisions. A relatively small force quickly destroyed the Iraqi military capacity and took Baghdad, but failed to stop the looting and destruction of government building, as well as the dissemination of Iraqi weapons to the public. There followed decisions to disband the military and effect a deep de-Bathification which have been linked to the initiation and/or strengthening of the insurgency. The decision to have a brutal liberalization of the economy resulted in lots of consumer goods, but also a lack of productive jobs. The decisions on the management of the occupation lead to the abuses of Abu Ghraib and a great deal of antipathy among Iraqis toward the occupying forces. Other decisions, such as the development of a new constitution, the timing of elections, the attacks on Fallujah and their conduct have been challenged as leading to a worsening of the situation. Of course, these decisions were also subsequent to decisions about the coordination of Iraq policy in the U.S. Government and Coalition, and decisions about the people to put in charge of the occupation who made or influenced many of the subsequent decisions that proved unfortunate.

I would say that the opening decision may have looked better after half a decade had the subsequent decisions been different, and thus the course of the occupation and "nation building" been different and perhaps more positive. (Indeed, once U.S. foreign policy institutions contained thousands of people who had thought long and deep about nation building, and who had decades of experience, but they had all gone due to the decisions to weaken those institutions.)

The point I would make is that the decision to go to war almost guarantees that many subsequent decisions on the conduct of the war and the subsequent search for nation building and peace will be badly made. Sometimes people ask about "the plan B" -- what will you do when things go wrong.

Chess players in the opening focus on building a strong position in the opening game, avoiding high risk initial gambits that offer the chance of a quick win but the threat of an eventual loss if mistakes are made and capitalized by a clever opponent. Perhaps in foreign policy, too, the best approach is to build a strong position in whih the country can respond to the unexpected, as well as to tactical moves that go wrong.