I think more generally he is saying that an unchecked central government is likely to both fail to respect human rights and to deteriorate into authoritarianism unless checked by important forces. Among those forces are religions institutions (under a system separating church and state), businesses under private enterprise, and organized civil society. He also points out that constitutional liberalism (in the classical sense of liberal) provides undemocratic controls such as independent courts, separation of policy making and implementation in independent branches of government, and constitutional bills of rights.
He raises the question of culture, pointing out that there are a number of historical examples in which countries have instituted liberal regimes rather quickly, as was done in Germany and Japan after World War II, and in Central European nations after the fall of Communism.
The question I ask myself is, absent major outside influences, does culture determine whether the policies will be accepted and implmented necessary to produce constitutional liberalism and strong non-governmental institutions needed to balance the power of government. Perhaps the difficulty of this happening is why the successes that come to mind, outside of foreign invasion, were based on liberalizing authoritarian regimes, often imposed my military coup.
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Zakaria cites research that shows that the persistence of democratic institutions is correlated with per capita GDP. I note that the oil exporting countries seem to have both high per capita GDP and authoritarian governance. So perhaps it is not the income per se.
I offer the hypothesis that countries that have high per capita GDP without a mineral bonanza have to develop human and social capital to achieve that productivity, and that it is the human and institutional capital that promotes the institutional diversity and civil culture that maintains democracy more effectively.
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