Do I Understand the Roots of Russian Absorption of Crimea?

I normally try to avoid posting on things on which I don't know much. This is an exception, as I really don't know much about Russia, Ukraine or Crimea. Readers might comment to correct me, as this post is my trying to thing through the current news stories.

Do I have the chronology correct?

• A Common Economic Space for Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan was announced in 2003. The supranational commission for the CES was located in Kiev. The Ukrainian Rada voted in favor of the CES.
• Viktor Yanukovych was declared victor in the presidential election of 2004, leading to massive protests -- the Orange Revolution -- and a new election was held under international monitoring in which Viktor Yushchenko was elected. Yushchenko took office in 2005.
• Yushchenko moved Ukraine toward entry into the European Union, which would have been incompatible with CES membership (a condition imposed by the EU).
• Ukraine joined the World Trade Organization in 2008.
• Viktor Yanukovych was elected president of Ukraine in 2010. His support was primarily from the east of the country. Ethnic Russians of the Ukraine tend to be concentrated in the east of the country, while ethnic Ukrainians are greater majorities in the west.
• On March 1, 2010 the first deputy head of the presidential administration of newly elected Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, Iryna Akymova stated that Ukraine does not intend to join the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus in the near future "Since the customs union contradicts and will greatly complicate Ukraine's membership in the WTO".
• According to Wikipedia: Euromaidan "began on the night of 21 November 2013, when protests erupted in the capital, Kiev, after the Ukrainian government suspended preparations for signing an Association Agreement and a Free Trade Agreement with the European Union, in order to seek closer economic relations with Russia. The president had asked for 20 billion USD in loans and aid. The EU was willing to offer 610 million euros (838 million USD) in loans, however Russia was willing to offer 15 billion USD in loans. Russia also offered Ukraine cheaper gas prices. In addition to the money, the EU required major changes to the regulations and laws in Ukraine; Russia, however, did not.
• Diplomats from western Europe, Poland, and the United States seek to mediate in the controversy.
• The Euromaiden protests succeeded with the fall of the Yanukovych government and the assumption of power of a revised Rada and its appointees (February 18-23, 2014)
• The day after the Yanukovych regime fell, the language law of 2012 was repealed. (That law made Russian a regional language, alongside Ukrainian as state language.)  That in turn was later vetoed by interim president Oleksandr Turchynov.
• Crimea saw demonstrations in favor of and opposed to the change in government in Kiev on February 23. There followed days of demonstrations and political change until armed men took over the region on February 28.
• March saw Crimean officials vote to apply for membership in the Russian Federation, a controversial referendum in which a large majority of voters supported affiliation with Russia, and the announcement by President Putin that Crimea was again part of Russia.

Recall that the Sochi winter Olympics took place between February 7 and February 27. It was a very expensive effort that involved President Putin's personal attention during its operation. Almost certainly intended to improve the image of Russia worldwide, its impact on global public opinion was dramatically reduced by the Euromaidan demonstrations.

Why Did the Russian Do What They Did?

A possible explanation of Russian actions here seems to me to be one of responses to rapid events of others.

• The creation of an common market involving Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan would have both economic value to Russia and political value to Putin.
• Were Ukraine to have links to both the EU and the CES it might have been a bridge between the two economic zones; the refusal of the EU to allow Ukraine to belong to both, had EU membership gone through, would have had the effects of  weakening the CES from what had been hoped by Putin; Russians might have feared the Ukraine would become a pro-NATO force on Russia's border.
• The Russian counter offer to EU support was perhaps meant as a means to revise Ukrainian linkages weakening its approach to the EU and strengthening its linkages with Russia and the CES.
• The fall of Yanukovych and his government was a significant defeat for Putin and the Russian initiative. It probably had not been predicted long in advance.
• The aborted repeal of the law allowing Russian to be used as a regional language would probably have been perceived in Russia as a significant sign of anti-Russian animus on the part of the interim Ukrainian government.
• The demonstrations of the ethnic Russian majority in Crimea illustrated a willingness in that area to leave Ukraine and join Russia. The area was important to Russia because it was the home of the Russian Black Sea fleet, and because much of Russian exports moved through Crimean ports.
• Putin encouraged the secession of Crimea from Ukraine and its accession to Russia, accepting the costs in worsening relations with Ukraine, the EU, and the USA, because the move was popular in Russia, because it showed Russian power counteracting the apparent weakness in the loss of its ally in Kiev, and because it was consonant with his vision of Russia as a global economic and political power with deep historical roots.

The Russian government seems to have long term plans to improve the Russian economy and to assure Russian security by maintaining strength and preventing threats from rising in a region of influence, especially the adjoining countries.

However, the decisions made this month may have been tactical responses to the actions of others in Ukraine, Crimea, and the west.

Source: "This one map helps explain Ukraine’s protests", The Washington Post